Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine has changed not only the direction of freight flows in the Black Sea region, but also the economic logic of its transport system. Before 2022, major ports competed primarily for access to raw materials, industrial centres and international shipping services. The ability to maintain continuity of delivery when one or more links in the transport chain are disrupted has now become a crucial competitive factor. As a result, geographical proximity to a market no longer guarantees economic accessibility, and spare terminal capacity does not imply that the entire route has spare carrying capacity.

Over four years, several overlapping transport systems have emerged in the region: the Ukrainian system, oriented towards both maritime exports and European land connections; the Russian system, restructuring trade in response to sanctions and wartime risks; the western Black Sea system, integrated with EU and Danube infrastructure; the southern system, in which Türkiye links Black Sea shipping with the Mediterranean; and the eastern system, providing the South Caucasus and Central Asia with access to European markets. These systems cannot fully substitute for one another, since they serve different commodities, economic areas and markets. Their interaction will shape the prospects of the Black Sea region over the coming years.

From the pre-war geography to four phases of restructuring

The pre-war model was based on specialisation. Ukrainian ports handled exports of grain, ore and metal products; Russian ports handled hydrocarbons, grain, coal and other bulk commodities; Romania and Bulgaria served their domestic economies and connections with inland Europe; and Georgia handled regional imports, oil transit and the Caucasus's access to the sea. Türkiye combined industrial imports and exports with its role as an intermediary between maritime basins. A key feature of this geography was the relatively high concentration of bulk cargo at specialised deep-water ports.

The first disruption occurred in February 2022. The blockade of Ukrainian ports and loss of access to some infrastructure made it necessary to establish alternative export and import routes urgently. The European Solidarity Lanes began operating in May, followed by the Black Sea Grain Initiative in August. Switching to the Danube, railways and road transport enabled some exports to continue, but entailed additional handling operations and higher unit transport costs. At the same time, Russia's foreign trade began adapting to the changing sanctions regime and the withdrawal of a number of international companies.

The second phase, in 2023, was characterised by the greatest reliance on alternative routes in Ukraine and an increase in Russia's southern freight flows. After Russia withdrew from the Grain Initiative in July, Ukraine established its own maritime corridor in August. The third phase, in 2024–2025, demonstrated that emergency rerouting does not necessarily become permanent. The return of cargo to Greater Odesa reduced throughput at some Danube and Romanian terminals. Nevertheless, the investments, commercial relationships and new transport procedures established in previous years did not disappear with the cargo.

The fourth phase emerged in 2026. Some maritime flows continued during the first half of the year, but the subsequent intensification of attacks on merchant shipping and port infrastructure sharply constrained the export capabilities of both Ukraine and Russia. This does not imply equal responsibility on both sides: Russian aggression remains the root cause of the crisis. From a transport economics perspective, the significant development is that deteriorating security began affecting several previously independent freight flows simultaneously.

The scale of redistribution: what port statistics reveal

Comparing national data series requires first defining their geographical coverage. Russian statistics distinguish the Azov–Black Sea basin, Georgian statistics cover all the country's seaports and terminals, and Türkiye's national statistics encompass four maritime basins. Constanța also handles both seagoing vessels and inland waterway vessels. Consequently, the absolute volumes in the table cannot be aggregated into a statistically consistent total from which national shares of a single Black Sea market could be calculated. Changes in each series, however, reveal the dynamics of the corresponding transport system.

Table 1. Port cargo throughput in Black Sea countries, million tonnes
Country / statistical coverage2021202320242025
Ukraine, operational ports153.362.097.282.2
Russia, Azov–Black Sea basin256.8291.4—265.4
Romania, Constanța—92.677.567.0
Bulgaria, seaports——≈29.527.49
Georgia, ports and terminals17.0414.7115.5816.64
Türkiye, all maritime basins526.3521.1531.7553.3

Sources: USPA / CTS, USPA, 2025, ASOP, 2021, 2023, 2025, Constanța port administration data reported in the trade press, Bulgaria's National Statistical Institute, Geostat, p. 5, TÜRKLİM. Bulgaria's 2024 figure is calculated retrospectively from the rounded rate of decline. A dash indicates that a figure is not provided, rather than a zero volume. Coverage differs; the rows must not be added together.

Chart 1. Change in port cargo throughput, 2023–2025, %

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Source: BlackSeaTrans calculations based on Table 1 (USPA, ASOP, Constanța port administration, Geostat, TÜRKLİM).

Change relative to 2023. Russia refers to the Azov–Black Sea basin, Romania to Constanța, and Türkiye to all maritime basins. Bulgaria is excluded because Table 1 does not provide a 2023 figure. The chart compares changes within each statistical series, not national shares of regional throughput.

The figures rule out a simple interpretation of events as a transfer of cargo from one country to another. Ukraine's 2025 figure was approximately 46% below its pre-war level, whereas Russia's southern basin remained only 3.3% above its 2021 level. Compared with the 2023 peak, the Russian figure also declined, by 8.9%. Georgia's throughput had approached its pre-war level by 2025, although its commodity mix had changed substantially. Following its record year in 2023, Constanța lost more than a quarter of its throughput.

The tonnage lost by Ukrainian ports was not necessarily redirected to other ports in the region. Some industrial production was lost, some cargo never reached foreign markets, and some moved to land routes or ports in other basins. At the same time, neighbouring countries saw growth in their own freight flows. Identifying the origin of each additional tonne requires data on commodities, countries of origin, destinations and routes. Aggregate throughput figures alone cannot reconstruct this matrix.

Ukraine: from single-route efficiency to network-wide resilience

According to the OECD's 2026 study, even before the invasion, most of the country's port capacity was concentrated in four major ports, including Mykolaiv. Concentration generated economies of scale but became a source of vulnerability when maritime routes were blocked. Unlike containerised consignments with a high value per unit of weight, ore and grain cannot be transferred to road transport in their previous volumes without substantially altering transport economics.

The redistribution between Greater Odesa and Ukraine's Danube ports was particularly revealing. In 2023, the Danube ports handled approximately half of Ukraine's total port tonnage. In 2024, the main freight flow returned to deep-water ports, and in 2025 the Danube's share declined again. Nevertheless, the ability to switch routes acquired strategic value independently of current utilisation.

Table 2. Changes in the composition of Ukrainian port throughput
YearAll operational ports, MtDanube ports, MtDanube share, %
2021153.35.53.6
202362.032.0251.6
202497.217.4017.9
202582.28.9110.8

Sources: OECD, USPA / CTS, USPA, Danube Commission, Table 3.6; shares calculated by BlackSeaTrans. Figures are rounded; series from different releases may contain minor discrepancies.

Chart 2. Changes in the composition of Ukrainian port throughput

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Sources: OECD, USPA / CTS, Danube Commission; BlackSeaTrans calculations (Table 2).

The total height of each bar represents overall throughput. The Danube share and total tonnage are available in the interactive tooltip. Table 2 does not include 2022.

If port infrastructure is viewed solely as a commercial asset, the subsequent decline in Danube tonnage appears to represent a loss of market share. From the perspective of the national transport system, however, an alternative route also performs an insurance function. Its value depends not only on current revenue but also on the potential economic losses if the main route is unavailable. This benefit should not be confused with a terminal operator's ordinary profit: maintaining reserve infrastructure requires an appropriate model for sharing costs between the state and businesses.

The importance of such a model became apparent again in 2026. According to DG MOVE, about 90% of Ukrainian exports of grain, oilseeds and related products passed through Black Sea ports in June, whereas by September approximately the same share was carried via the Solidarity Lanes. This illustrates the scale of the shift in routes, but does not establish that land transport replaced maritime tonnage on an equivalent basis.

Table 3. Share of the Solidarity Lanes in selected categories of Ukraine's foreign trade, %
Period in 2026Grain, oilseeds and related productsNon-agricultural exportsImports
June≈10≈80≈70
July≈20≈95≈90
September≈90≈90Nearly 100

Sources: DG MOVE, June, July, September 2026. Shares are approximate; the Solidarity Lanes include rail, road and inland waterway transport.

By September 2026, approximately 240 million tonnes of Ukrainian goods had been exported and around 116 million tonnes imported via the Solidarity Lanes since their establishment. According to the European Commission, the value of imports on these routes was substantially higher than the value of exports. This is an important structural distinction: exports of bulk raw materials and imports of industrial goods require different types of rolling stock, equipment and delivery arrangements. Opposing cargo flows therefore do not always eliminate empty running.

It is premature to conclude that Ukraine has irreversibly shifted from sea to land. Once security conditions normalise, deep-water exports will again enjoy an advantage for large consignments of raw materials. The long-term transformation instead consists in the emergence of two complementary directions. Land routes can sustainably serve imports, trade with the EU, processed products and containerisable goods, whilst remaining a reserve option for part of the bulk export market.

Russia: redirecting exports does not remove infrastructure dependence

Growth in cargo throughput in Russia's Azov–Black Sea basin in 2022–2023 reflected sustained foreign demand for Russian raw materials and the restructuring of trade geography. Changing buyers, however, does not automatically increase the profitability of export operations. Longer routes, longer vessel turnaround times, sanctions checks, financing restrictions and the need to work with a different set of counterparties influence operating costs even if physical tonnage is maintained.

A second feature is the concentration of cargo flows at the most productive hubs. Novorossiysk accounted for approximately 63% of the southern basin's throughput in 2025, compared with around 56% in 2021. At the same time, volumes declined at several other ports. Such concentration creates economies of scale, but increases the system's dependence on the availability of a single major hub.

Table 4. Changes in the distribution of throughput in Russia's southern basin
Port / basin2021, Mt2025, MtChange, %
Novorossiysk142.8168.0+17.6
Taman35.829.5−17.6
Tuapse24.721.8−11.7
Kavkaz17.114.9−12.9
Rostov-on-Don15.612.7−18.6
Entire Azov–Black Sea basin256.8265.4+3.3

Sources: ASOP, 2021, ASOP, 2025; BlackSeaTrans calculations. The basin total also includes other ports; the Russian statistical classification does not imply recognition of any change to Ukraine's internationally recognised borders.

According to Morcentre's preliminary estimate for January–June 2026, throughput in Russia's southern basin was still increasing in the first half of the year. However, OSW's analysis of 14 September 2026 documents a sharp deterioration in oil and grain exports through this basin in August. Monthly figures for individual commodities cannot be extrapolated to the entire year, but demonstrate how rapidly the availability of export routes can change.

For Russia, alternative exports through the Baltic, Far East or Caspian are constrained by more than port capacity. Shifting cargo between maritime basins changes rail haulage distances, the distribution of pipeline flows and rolling stock requirements. For grain exports, the relationship between transport costs and procurement prices is also crucial. Not every cargo that can technically be handled at another port can economically be shipped via that route. The long-term effects of transport restrictions may therefore become visible in production and export composition, rather than solely in throughput statistics.

A separate issue concerns Kazakhstan, a substantial proportion of whose oil exports depends on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. This demonstrates that disruptions at Black Sea hubs have consequences extending beyond the six coastal states. Redirecting oil or pipeline flows to a container rail corridor, however, is not a direct alternative: specialised facilities, separate agreements and an economically viable transport chain are required.

The western coast: reserve infrastructure and the European market

In 2023, Constanța became one of the most prominent hubs for the redistribution of Ukrainian exports. Over the following two years, its throughput declined from 92.6 to 67 million tonnes, whilst grain handling fell from 36 to 18.3 million tonnes, according to port administration data reported in the trade press. Of the overall reduction of approximately 25.6 million tonnes, around 17.7 million tonnes came from the grain segment. This accounts for almost 69% of the difference; however, commodity-level statistics do not allow the entire decline to be attributed exclusively to Ukrainian transit.

Bulgaria did not experience growth on the scale of Constanța. The country's seaports handled 27.49 million tonnes in 2025, 6.9% less than in the preceding year, according to national statistics. Their role is determined by domestic trade, connections with the Danube region, rail and road access to the Balkans, and the potential to develop regular services to the eastern Black Sea coast. For Varna and Burgas, specialisation in competitive segments is more realistic than attempting to replace the large-scale raw material exports of several countries simultaneously.

The evolution of Danube port throughput is particularly instructive. Unlike seaport statistics, these figures reflect the operation of the inland waterway network and its connections with maritime terminals. Moldova is worth including in the comparison even though it has no Black Sea coastline: Giurgiulești connects the Moldovan economy with international shipping and can serve some neighbouring cargo flows.

Table 5. Port throughput in Danube countries according to the Danube Commission, million tonnes
Country202320242025H1 2025H1 2026
Ukraine32.02117.3968.9074.4643.401
Romania28.85723.75919.4999.0499.314
Bulgaria7.0267.5205.9973.3062.916
Moldova2.6682.5792.6261.0781.654

Source: Danube Commission, Market Observation, January–June 2026, Table 3.6, p. 18. Figures reflect the coverage of the Commission's report rather than total national port throughput; cargo may be counted at several ports.

Compared with the first half of 2025, throughput at Ukrainian Danube ports declined by approximately 24% in January–June 2026 and at Bulgarian ports by 12%, whilst Romanian throughput increased by 3% and Moldovan throughput by more than 53%. These differences caution against treating the Danube as a single market. Commodity flows, fleets, navigational constraints, terminal infrastructure and customer profiles differ between the upper and lower reaches of the river. Growth in one section does not necessarily reduce costs in another.

In the longer term, the advantage of Constanța and other western Black Sea ports lies not in the temporary diversion of Ukrainian grain, but in their ability to connect shipping services to the EU market. An efficient network, however, requires coordination of railway timetables, the condition of navigable channels, storage capacity and customs procedures. Investment solely in berth capacity may fail to increase end-to-end throughput if the bottleneck lies in the approaches to the port.

Türkiye: logistics intermediation and the limits of the transit effect

Türkiye occupies a distinctive position: it controls passage through the Black Sea straits under an international regime, whilst possessing a large industrial economy of its own. Its role as the maritime gateway to the region must, however, be distinguished from the performance of ports located directly on the Black Sea coast. Direct transit through the straits does not necessarily involve cargo handling at a Turkish port.

A previous BlackSeaTrans study found that although Türkiye's national port throughput grew by 5.1% between 2021 and 2025, transit tonnage declined by 11.3%. The Sea of Marmara accounted for most of the increase in container throughput. This suggests that Türkiye's adaptation to changing trade links was not simply a matter of substituting for other countries' port infrastructure. Imports for domestic industry and regular trade with global markets play a significant role.

From a geographical perspective, complementary connections offer the greatest potential: Black Sea ferry and feeder routes, container services in the Sea of Marmara, land transport to the EU and rail access through the South Caucasus. Each connection, however, requires return cargo and regular schedules. Geographical location provides an opportunity to participate in freight transport; it does not guarantee commercial demand for every proposed route.

Georgia and the South Caucasus: structural change matters more than total tonnage

Georgian statistics reveal one of the most interesting developments. In 2025, the country's seaports and terminals handled 16.64 million tonnes, slightly below the 17.04 million tonnes recorded in 2021. General cargo volumes increased by approximately 53%, whilst liquid bulk fell by around 35%. A relatively stable overall volume thus conceals a fundamental transformation in the commodity mix.

Table 6. Changes in Georgia's port cargo mix, million tonnes
Cargo type202120232025Change 2025 vs 2021, %
General cargo5.196.737.94+52.9
Liquid bulk7.924.445.15−34.9
Dry bulk3.933.543.55−9.8
Total17.0414.7116.64−2.4

Source: Geostat, Major Indicators of Seaports and Terminals 2025, p. 5; BlackSeaTrans calculations based on the original figures. General cargo is not synonymous with containerised cargo; figures are rounded.

The changing composition has implications for investment. A terminal oriented towards general and containerisable cargo requires different equipment and operating arrangements from an oil terminal. At the same time, its relationship with the inland transport network changes: rail and road services, warehousing and customs support become increasingly important.

The trend received further confirmation in 2026. On 10 November, Batumi Sea Port reported handling 6.9 million tonnes over ten months, 13% more than in the corresponding period of the previous year. Ferry cargo increased by 58%. This concerns a single enterprise, not Georgia as a whole. Nevertheless, the expansion of ferry services to Constanța and Varna demonstrates the development of direct connections between the eastern and western Black Sea coasts, rather than relying solely on cargo movements through Türkiye.

The Middle Corridor — the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route — remains the basis for growth on a larger scale. Its geography connects Central Asian and Chinese markets with the South Caucasus, with several onward routes to Europe. For cargo originating within the region itself, it represents not only a bypass but also an opportunity for direct market access. Regional trade may provide the underlying cargo volumes needed to support regular services.

Table 7. Freight volumes along the Middle Corridor
YearMillion tonnesYear-on-year change, %
20221.70—
20232.76+62.4
20244.48+62.3
20254.12−8.0

Sources: Ministry of Transport of Kazakhstan, statement of 10 March 2026, The Astana Times, October 2026; growth rates calculated by BlackSeaTrans using the indicated series. Other publications report rounded volumes and different statistical coverage.

Chart 3. Middle Corridor freight volumes, million tonnes

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Sources: Ministry of Transport of Kazakhstan, The Astana Times (Table 7).

The decline in tonnage in 2025 does not negate the corridor's long-term potential. Over the same period, container traffic increased to approximately 77,000 TEU. Nevertheless, the absolute scale remains limited: annual recorded tonnage along the entire Middle Corridor amounts to around 5% of Ukrainian port throughput over the same period. This comparison illustrates the orders of magnitude, rather than the share of one market in another. The Middle Corridor cannot be regarded as a universal substitute for deep-water bulk exports or maritime trade between Asia and Europe.

The World Bank's research programme links the possibility of tripling freight flows by 2030 to reforms and infrastructure investment. A new study published in 2026 extends the horizon to 2040. These results are conditional and refer to the scope of the World Bank's models, which cannot automatically be equated with the annual tonnage reported by Kazakhstan. The most difficult stage of corridor development is the transition from individual national capacities to a unified transport product offering predictable costs and delivery times.

Land transport integration: the changing role of railways and road transport

The Black Sea region cannot be analysed solely through port statistics. In many supply chains, maritime transport is one of several successive stages, and the economic outcome depends on the performance of rail approaches, dry ports and road border crossings. Changes in the geography of final buyers can alter the efficiency of port assets even when berth capacity remains unchanged.

In Ukraine, two distinct tasks coexist: transporting large consignments of raw materials and integrating with the European industrial market. The first requires large-scale maritime handling and high-performance railways. The second requires interoperability, regular transport services and a more developed terminal network. Construction of European standard-gauge track (1,435 mm) in western Ukraine is particularly important for the second task, but does not in itself eliminate the need for broad-gauge track (1,520 mm) when shipping goods from the central and eastern regions. This issue is examined in detail in the BlackSeaTrans study on the carrying capacity of Ukrainian railways (in Russian).

Road transport offers greater flexibility in route planning and a smaller minimum economically viable consignment size. According to European Commission data, EU imports from Ukraine by road amounted to 7.7 million tonnes in 2024, 13% more than in 2021; exports in the opposite direction reached 7.6 million tonnes, an increase of 11%. In value terms, EU imports from Ukraine amounted to €10.1 billion, whilst exports to Ukraine reached €33.4 billion. Nearly equal physical volumes with such different values reflect differences in the composition of trade, although they do not directly indicate hauliers' profitability.

For Ukraine and the European Union, the road transport liberalisation agreement, extended until 31 March 2027, reduces administrative barriers to bilateral and transit transport. Removing permit requirements, however, does not create physical capacity at the border or eliminate the need for economically efficient vehicle turnaround. When maritime transport is disrupted, these constraints rapidly become significant, as demonstrated in the BlackSeaTrans sector study (in Russian).

Aviation plays a different role. It cannot absorb significant volumes of grain, ore or petroleum products, but is important for urgent, high-value and time-sensitive consignments. Restrictions on Ukrainian air services and the restructuring of Russia's international aviation market increase the importance of neighbouring countries' airports as independent logistics hubs. For the transport market as a whole, this is another reason why comparisons between modes cannot be confined to tonnage.

The economics of the new transport geography

One of the most important consequences of the war has been the growing significance of total delivery costs. Under normal conditions, cargo owners can compare nominal freight rates and transit times. Under conditions of instability, calculations must also include the costs of waiting, additional working capital, reserve equipment and the probability of failing to meet commitments. A route with a higher nominal rate may sometimes be economically preferable because of a lower risk of downtime.

For bulk cargo, a simplified choice illustrates this principle. Suppose two delivery options cost €35 and €50 per tonne, but a disruption on the first route requires emergency rerouting at an additional cost of €60 per tonne. The second option is assumed to be stable. At a 25% probability of disruption, the expected cost of the first option equals that of the second: 35 + 0.25 × 60 = €50. If the risk is higher, the initially more expensive route may be preferable. This illustrates the principle rather than estimating actual rates or probabilities at a particular port.

For terminal operators, a similar problem arises in the economics of reserve capacity. Utilisation achieved during an emergency surge in demand may decline once a competing route is restored. Investors must distinguish between capacity required to serve a sustainable regular market and capacity whose value is primarily associated with crisis conditions. The latter may require different sources of funding and should not automatically be valued on the basis of peak tonnage.

The asymmetry of risks must also be considered. The absence of physical damage at an individual facility does not guarantee normal operation of a route if power supplies, insurance or freight acceptance on the adjoining network are disrupted. What is emerging in the region is not so much a set of new permanent lines on the map as a portfolio of potential delivery routes with different levels of availability. The commercial value of each route varies over time.

European strategy: from local measures to interregional connectivity

In May 2025, the European Union presented a new strategy for the Black Sea region, combining security, economic connectivity and resilience. For transport, the interrelated priorities are maritime security and the creation of resilient transport connections between the EU, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. These priorities imply a broader approach than funding individual ports and border crossings.

The decisions taken at the ministerial meeting of 16 November 2026are particularly significant. The documents emphasise the importance of coordinating customs procedures, digital systems, infrastructure investment and commercially viable transport services. This indicates a transition from conceptual discussions to the institutional organisation of interregional connections. Political commitments and investment programmes, however, do not yet amount to completed projects or guaranteed utilisation.

The countries that benefit most in the regional economy will not necessarily be those handling the greatest volumes of transit cargo. Transit can generate limited local added value if all key services are provided by external companies and cargo passes through a country without processing. A more substantial benefit arises when transport connectivity becomes the basis for industrial cooperation, warehousing, service exports and the establishment of new production facilities. Corridor policy outcomes should therefore be assessed not only by tonnage but also by indicators of employment, investment and the value of trade.

2027–2030: three scenarios for transport system transformation

Long-term forecasting for the region is complicated by the fact that maritime security, the duration of the war, the sanctions regime and infrastructure reconstruction timelines cannot reliably be described by extrapolating statistical series. It is therefore more appropriate to consider several possible ways in which the network may operate rather than a single annual tonnage forecast. The differences between them depend on the regular availability of major ports, the ability of reserve routes to serve sustainable demand, and the extent of institutional integration between transport systems.

The first scenario is prolonged restrictions. With serious disruptions to maritime transport continuing, Ukraine is forced to rely on land and Danube routes, whilst Russia's southern exports face pressure from wartime risks and sanctions-related restrictions. Demand for alternative infrastructure is high, but a deterioration in general economic conditions may constrain tonnage even where spare capacity exists. Terminal projects face increased uncertainty regarding utilisation, whilst shipping remains highly sensitive to insurance conditions.

The second scenario is partial stabilisation. Maritime transport is periodically disrupted, but most commercial operations gradually return to the most economical routes. Land connections continue to develop, primarily through trade with the EU, imports and higher-value-added segments. Turkish and Georgian logistics hubs strengthen their position, but growth depends on their ability to provide regular services rather than simply on the opening of new infrastructure facilities. This scenario is useful as a working basis for long-term planning, without assigning it a calculated probability.

The third scenario is sustained normalisation of shipping and Ukraine's recovery. The resumption of large-scale maritime exports reduces pressure on western land border crossings. Imports of construction materials and equipment, the restoration of industrial supply chains and infrastructure modernisation gradually come to the fore. Sanctions policy towards Russia, however, need not change at the same time as security improves. Consequently, the recovery of regional shipping does not in itself guarantee that Russia's foreign trade will return to its pre-war configuration.

To illustrate these scenarios quantitatively, two different markets are considered. For Ukraine, a hypothetical monthly average port throughput in 2030 is converted into an annual volume. For the Middle Corridor, a hypothetical annual growth rate is applied to the published 2025 result of 4.12 million tonnes over five years. These assumptions do not constitute a forecast of military or political developments; they are intended to test the scale of possible freight flows under different conditions.

Table 8. Conditional freight flow scenarios for 2030
ScenarioUkraine: Mt per month (assumption)Ukraine: Mt per year (calculated)Middle Corridor: annual growth, % (assumption)Middle Corridor: Mt per year (calculated)
Prolonged restrictions4.0–6.048.0–72.02–54.5–5.3
Partial stabilisation7.0–9.084.0–108.08–136.1–7.6
Sustained normalisation and investment10.0–12.5120.0–150.016–228.7–11.1

Source: BlackSeaTrans scenario model. Middle Corridor baseline: 4.12 million tonnes in 2025; Ukrainian port comparison baseline: 82.2 million tonnes in 2025. Formulae: annual port tonnage = 12 × average monthly volume; Middle Corridor tonnage = 4.12 × (1 + g)5, where g is the assumed annual growth rate expressed as a decimal. The assumptions are expert estimates, not confidence intervals. The series are not additive.

Chart 4. Ukrainian port throughput scenarios for 2030

Interactive chart: if JavaScript is unavailable, please refer to the table above.

Source: BlackSeaTrans scenario model (Table 8).

The bars indicate the bounds of scenario estimates, not confidence intervals.

Chart 5. Middle Corridor freight volume scenarios for 2030

Interactive chart: if JavaScript is unavailable, please refer to the table above.

Source: BlackSeaTrans scenario model (Table 8).

The ranges are based on the expert assumptions specified in Table 8.

Under the first scenario, Ukrainian ports remain substantially below their 2025 result. Under the second, they return to a range close to the volumes recorded in 2024–2025. Under the third, they may approach the pre-war scale of throughput, although this requires not only safe access to the sea but also the recovery of production, connecting infrastructure and the underlying cargo base. The pre-war figure of 153.3 million tonnes is not a guaranteed target: Ukraine's economic structure in 2030 may differ from that of 2021.

Even accelerated growth along the Middle Corridor would not make the route equivalent to a large national port system. The upper bound of the favourable scenario implies exceeding the current stated capacity of individual links, and therefore requires the successful commissioning of new capacity and reductions in waiting times. Without sufficient coordination between countries, increased investment may create underutilised infrastructure in one location whilst congestion persists elsewhere.

For Romania and Bulgaria, the nature of the recovery of Ukrainian maritime transport is important. Under prolonged disruption, some demand for alternative routes may persist, but the decline in Ukrainian exports itself constrains its potential scale. In a favourable scenario, western Black Sea ports may lose some emergency transit traffic whilst benefiting from more stable regional shipping, industrial cooperation and Ukraine's reconstruction. For Georgia, the regularity of east–west services and the development of trade in the Caucasus and Central Asia are critical; for Türkiye, the crucial factor is the balance between its own cargo base, international connections and the economic efficiency of intermediary operations.

This study deliberately does not produce quantitative estimates of total port throughput in Russia, Constanța, Bulgaria, Georgia and Türkiye in 2030. A unified model would require comparable data on commodity flows and destination markets, production forecasts, infrastructure constraints and investment projects. This does not preclude identifying the direction of structural change, but avoids false precision.

What will determine the competitiveness of transport hubs?

Annual changes in port tonnage alone are insufficient to assess the region's evolving transport system. Indicators that simultaneously reflect resource utilisation, reliability and commercial performance are more informative. They differ between transport modes but should follow a comparable logic: how much cargo was actually delivered from consignor to buyer, at what cost and within what timeframe.

The first indicator is actual exports via primary and alternative routes, measured both in absolute quantities and as shares. Both measures are necessary, since a growing share of a declining total volume can be misinterpreted as market expansion. The second is the concentration of cargo flows at hubs and the extent to which those hubs are operationally interchangeable. High concentration improves productivity under normal conditions but increases the damage caused by a common failure.

The third indicator is the total turnaround time of transport equipment, including waiting and return journeys. The fourth is service regularity: median delivery times and deviations from schedules, rather than nominal travel speed alone. The fifth is the cost of end-to-end transport relative to the price of the final commodity. It is this last indicator that determines which producers can retain access to international markets as transport geography changes.

Monitoring the Middle Corridor requires particular care not to conflate the number of container trains, container volumes in TEU, total national railway tonnage and the volume of through international freight. For the Danube, cargo handling must be distinguished from river transit, and seasonality taken into account. For Türkiye, transit through the straits, transit cargo handled at ports and imports for domestic consumers must be treated separately. Without these distinctions, positive figures for one link may be misinterpreted as an improvement in the entire system.

Conclusions: a region with multiple hubs and changing route availability

The principal outcome of the Black Sea region's transformation since 2022 has been not the emergence of a single new centre of transport activity, but the formation of a more complex system of interaction between several markets. The wartime crisis has altered the relative importance of their functions without eliminating pre-war economic principles. Bulk commodities still require large-scale maritime transport, European industrial trade requires resilient land connections, and transit between Asia and Europe requires coordination between several national transport systems.

For Ukraine, the principal long-term task is to combine the advantages of deep-water ports with reserve and commercially viable European routes. For Russian exporters, restricted access to traditional maritime routes may reduce the competitiveness of individual industries even if some cargo is redirected to other basins. For Romania and Bulgaria, leveraging their position at the interface between the EU single market and the Black Sea offers greater prospects than relying on indefinite emergency transit demand. Türkiye retains its role as a major industrial and logistics centre, whilst Georgia could become a crucial link in east–west routes if transport services prove competitive in commercial as well as political terms.

By 2030, competitive advantage will increasingly depend on the ability of transport systems to switch freight flows without disproportionate increases in cost or delivery time. In this sense, the new transport geography is not a list of alternative lines on a map, but a system of relationships between infrastructure, markets, technologies, institutional rules and risks. Countries that succeed in translating infrastructure connectivity into sustainable economic cooperation will be better placed to maintain their importance even after exceptional wartime demand subsides.

Methodology. This study was prepared as of 17 November 2026. Cross-country comparisons rely primarily on complete annual data series for 2021–2025, whilst the assessment of current conditions draws on available releases for individual periods of 2026. Statistical coverage varies: Russia's Azov–Black Sea basin, operational Ukrainian ports, Constanța, Bulgarian seaports, Georgian ports and terminals, and Türkiye's national figures. These volumes are not aggregated; the same cargo may be recorded at several points along a route. For Ukraine, the study uses the 2025 total of 82.2 million tonnes published by USPA; estimates appearing in other releases are not combined with it. Dashes in the tables indicate the absence of a reported comparable figure. Forecasts use conditional, explicitly stated assumptions rather than a probabilistic model. Calculations are rounded. Geographical descriptions do not constitute assessments of the operational availability of routes or commercial quotations.