Since 9 November 2026, French shipping group CMA CGM has been applying an additional charge of $35 per TEU to cargo shipments to and from Black Sea countries. At first sight, this appears to be a relatively modest adjustment to the cost of container transport. Behind it, however, lies a much more significant process: the war is transforming the Black Sea from a single transport area into a collection of markets with fundamentally different costs of risk. Insurance quotations on certain routes have already reached double-digit percentages of vessel value, while freight has become so expensive that even the availability of cargo and tonnage does not guarantee that a deal will be concluded.

The economic impact of the war cannot be measured solely by the cost of damaged vessels and destroyed terminals. It is also reflected in insurance costs, vessel idle time, shifts in the geography of shipping, reduced competition among shipowners and higher working capital costs for cargo owners. By November 2026, all these factors were operating simultaneously. The consequences are now being borne not only by those trading with Ukraine and Russia, but also by companies using the infrastructure of other Black Sea countries.

From localised war risk to a regional surcharge

CMA CGM announced its decision in late October. According to the carrier’s official notice of 30 October, the War Risk Surcharge (WRS) applies to all cargo categories shipped to and from Black Sea countries. The charge takes effect on 9 November for most trades, while shipments involving the United States and its territories, Australia, New Zealand and Latin American countries are subject to an effective date of 1 December 2026, reflecting regulatory procedures.

A regional advisory of 28 October specifically identifies Constanța, Poti, Varna and Burgas, as well as the other regional ports served by the company. The surcharge applies to dry, refrigerated and special cargo; the advisory specifies that it is based on the bill of lading date. A further CMA CGM notice clarifies that the charge also applies to shipments involving third-party feeder operators, including cargo for Ukraine, Moldova and Central Asian markets served via Constanța and Poti.

For the customer, the arithmetic is straightforward: $35 per twenty-foot container and $70 per standard forty-foot container. A shipment of 100 forty-foot containers would attract an additional charge of $7,000. For an importer shipping 10,000 TEU annually on affected routes, assuming the rate remains unchanged and the surcharge applies in full, this would amount to $350,000 per year.

Two concepts must, however, be distinguished. A container line’s WRS is a commercial tariff component, not a vessel insurance rate. The carrier distributes additional costs across its network’s cargo base. The amount of the surcharge reveals neither the insurance premium actually paid by the carrier nor the full operating cost of an individual voyage. Nor does it replace fuel, terminal, security or other charges provided for in the tariff.

For comparison, if the initial cost of shipping one TEU were $500, the new surcharge would increase it by 7%; at $1,000, by 3.5%; and at $2,000, by 1.75%. These are illustrative examples, not observed CMA CGM freight rates. They demonstrate why a fixed surcharge is particularly significant on relatively inexpensive short-sea routes.

How the insurance market has redrawn the Black Sea risk map

The immediate trigger for the tariff revision was a decision by the Joint War Committee (JWC), a committee of the London insurance market. In its JWLA-035 circular of 16 September 2026, the area of heightened war risk was extended to virtually the entire Black Sea. The territorial waters of coastal states other than Russia and Ukraine are excluded: namely, those of Türkiye, Bulgaria, Romania and Georgia.

This is neither a prohibition on navigation nor the establishment of a single mandatory insurance rate. The JWC Listed Areas provide guidance for underwriters; the consequences of entering a listed area are determined by the terms of the individual policy. Shipowners may be required to notify their insurer in advance, agree additional cover and pay a premium for an agreed period of exposure in the high-risk area.

Even if a destination port lies within excluded territorial waters, the approach route may pass through listed waters. Moreover, exclusion from the list does not mean an absence of threats. This is why the geographical scope of CMA CGM’s WRS extends beyond the area of the most intense military activity. The line’s tariff and the geographical limits of insurance cover address different questions.

How much does it now cost to insure a vessel?

Ordinary hull and machinery insurance (H&M), hull war risks insurance, shipowners’ liability insurance (Protection & Indemnity, P&I), war risks liability cover and cargo insurance are distinct components of the insurance system. Standard cover should not automatically be regarded as protection against all the consequences of armed conflict. Separate terms, exclusions and limits apply to war-related events.

At the centre of the present crisis is the additional premium for vessel war risks (Additional Premium, AP; also Extra War Risk Insurance, EWRI). It is usually expressed as a percentage of the insured value of the vessel for an agreed exposure — a period or port call as defined by the policy. The destination port, previous calls, route, duration of exposure, vessel value, ownership profile, reinsurance terms and claims history all matter.

Several points in time are useful for assessing the scale of the change. In December 2025, Reuters reported that premiums for certain high-risk Black Sea calls had risen to 0.6–1% of vessel value for a typical seven-day period. By autumn 2026, pricing differences between individual routes had become much more pronounced.

According to The Insurer on 27 October, brokers estimated additional premiums for transits towards Bulgaria and Romania at 0.4–1%, with one source citing an average quotation of around 0.5% on 26 October. Brokers’ estimates for certain calls at Ukrainian ports and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) oil terminal near Novorossiysk were several times higher.

On 6 November, Lloyd’s List reported that quotations had reached 20%. This represents the upper end of pricing for the most hazardous voyages, notably certain vessels heading to the CPC terminal. It is not an average insurance rate for the Black Sea, a universal tariff for Ukrainian ports or necessarily the price of a policy already agreed. A broker’s quotation may be subject to discounts, including the return of part of the premium in the absence of a claim (a no-claims bonus), or may not result in cover being placed at all.

Published percentages should therefore be compared with due regard to the date, navigation area, insured value, duration of cover and terms governing premium returns. In some cases, the problem is not the price itself but whether an insurer willing to accept the risk on the required terms can be found at all.

Voyage economics: when insurance costs more than freight itself

Consider a hypothetical bulk carrier with an insured value of $20 million and a commercial cargo load of 25,000 tonnes. For simplicity, assume that the additional premium is charged once for the period under consideration and calculated on the full insured value. Other expenses, discounts and premium returns are excluded at this stage.

Table 1. Impact of additional war risk premiums on voyage costs
Additional premiumInsurance costCost per tonne of cargo
0.5%$100,000$4
1%$200,000$8
5%$1 million$40
10%$2 million$80
20%$4 million$160

Source: BlackSeaTrans scenario calculations. The figures are not insurance quotations for a particular vessel or port; 20% represents a stress scenario, not an average market rate.

Even at a rate of 5%, war risk insurance alone adds $40 per tonne to transport costs. For low-margin commodity exports, this may be sufficient to render a shipment commercially unviable. Comparison with vessel value also explains another feature of the market: expensive modern tonnage incurs higher absolute costs at the same premium percentage, although an insurer’s individual decision may also depend on vessel age, technical condition and other characteristics.

Container shipping follows the same logic, but uses a different unit for allocating costs. Assume that a hypothetical 1,500 TEU feeder vessel has an insured value of $20 million and carries 1,200 TEU of revenue-generating cargo on a voyage. A single charge of $35 per revenue-generating TEU would yield $42,000. If the additional insurance premium were 0.5%, it would amount to $100,000, or approximately $83 per revenue-generating TEU. At 1%, the equivalent cost would be around $167 per TEU.

This is not a calculation of CMA CGM’s operations: the actual rates, value of its tonnage, container turnover across ports, utilisation in both directions and insurance terms are unknown. The example merely illustrates why a fixed surcharge cannot be equated directly with the costs of a single voyage. When vessel utilisation declines, the cost of risk per unit of cargo increases even if the insurance premium remains unchanged.

The withdrawal of tonnage: why freight rates rise faster than costs

Higher insurance premiums are only the first mechanism through which war affects the freight market. The second is a contraction in vessel supply. In international shipping, tonnage is mobile: an owner may choose to deploy a vessel in another region, particularly when an alternative voyage offers acceptable earnings without exceptional risk exposure.

According to an analysis by Lloyd’s List Intelligence, published on 9 November, 1,370 cargo vessels of more than 1,000 tonnes deadweight operated in the Black Sea in October 2026, compared with 2,091 in March. Over this period, the number of active vessels fell by approximately 34.5%; compared with October 2025, it fell by 37%. These figures refer to the number of vessels, not the tonnage of cargo carried.

In a separate article dated 6 November, the publication noted a particularly pronounced reduction in activity among container ships, bulk carriers and younger vessels. This creates conditions for a change in the composition of the fleet available to charterers. However, such statistics do not automatically imply that older vessels are unsuitable: age alone does not determine seaworthiness, insurability or safety.

When tonnage is scarce, the freight rate reflects not only costs incurred but also the vessel’s alternative earning potential, uncertainty over future voyages and the owner’s willingness to accept residual risk. With few suitable vessels available, increases in freight rates can substantially exceed increases in individual cost components. Conversely, falling cargo volumes may weaken demand. There is therefore no universal relationship between the number of vessels withdrawn and the percentage increase in freight rates.

Grain freight: from $23 to an asking rate of $130 per tonne

The extent to which Black Sea freight rates have diverged from broader global market trends is illustrated by Fastmarkets research dated 1 October 2026. Over the summer-to-autumn period under review, Panamax rates from the US Gulf and Brazil to Northeast Asia rose by approximately 7% and 16% respectively, while Black Sea freight rates on certain routes from Ukraine and Russia doubled or more. The routes differ in distance, demand structure and shipping conditions, so this comparison does not provide a precise estimate of the war-related component alone. Nevertheless, the scale of the divergence is indicative.

An even more striking example emerged in November. According to information from ASAP Agri and Atria Brokers published by UkrAgroConsult on 13 November, shipowners were offering to carry wheat from Greater Odesa ports to Egypt on Handysize vessels at $105 per tonne plus a $500,000 ballast bonus. For an assumed cargo parcel of around 20,000 tonnes, the effective asking rate would be approximately $130 per tonne. On 10 July, the benchmark for this route was $23 per tonne.

The November offer was thus approximately 5.65 times the July benchmark. For a parcel of 20,000 tonnes, the calculated transport costs at these two levels would amount to $2.6 million and $460,000 respectively, a difference of $2.14 million.

An essential qualification: during the reporting week, negotiations did not result in new fixtures at the quoted levels. The $130 per tonne figure therefore represents an estimated asking level, not a confirmed price for a shipment actually performed. The ballast bonus, in turn, is a negotiated additional payment associated with positioning the vessel; it cannot automatically be treated as an insurance premium.

The gap between the shipowner’s offer and the rate acceptable to the cargo owner becomes a constraint on trade in its own right. A market may formally offer tonnage while failing to provide commercially viable transport. In conditions of limited liquidity, published quotations increasingly reflect the expectations of one side rather than the price at which cargo is actually moved.

The Danube: the hidden cost of an alternative route

Diverting cargo from deep-water ports to the Danube partly preserves export opportunities, but does not eliminate the shortage of carrying capacity. Draught restrictions, smaller cargo parcels, additional transshipment, weather conditions and queues on the approaches to the Sulina Canal all increase the cost per tonne.

As early as 2 September, Drewry warned that congestion on the Danube was reducing the availability of small dry bulk and general cargo vessels. By mid-November, reports indicated another queue of more than 100 vessels near the Sulina Canal following a deterioration in weather conditions. In such circumstances, it is not only the cost of the sea passage that matters, but also the entire vessel turnaround time.

Assume that a hypothetical dry cargo vessel carries 5,000 tonnes and that an additional day of its employment, including associated costs, amounts to $10,000. Ten extra days of waiting would add $100,000, or $20 per tonne. This is a scenario calculation, not a prevailing demurrage rate. If the charterer compensates the owner for waiting time under the charter party, the effect will appear under the relevant cost heading. If the shipowner bears the cost, waiting before the next voyage may be factored into future freight rates. Counting the same period of time twice must be avoided.

Alternative corridors compete on more than price. Meeting delivery deadlines, accommodating the required cargo volume and ensuring the reliability of last-mile delivery must also be considered. The more cargo is diverted to a single alternative route, the greater the likelihood that it will become a bottleneck itself.

When a shipowner refuses a voyage

Decisions by individual container lines demonstrate that risk does not merely result in higher charges. On 22 July, Maersk announced the temporary suspension of its service via the Chornomorsk Fishing Port and the diversion of certain import shipments to Constanța. This concerned that particular service and terminal, rather than the suspension of all operations at the Port of Chornomorsk. On 26 August, Lloyd’s List reported that MSC had suspended new bookings to and from Novorossiysk following an attack on the container ship MSC Ulsan III. These are examples of decisions announced on the respective dates, not assertions about the current status of all services operated by these companies.

By early November, the issue also affected ports in NATO countries. Lloyd’s List reported on 3 November on potential charter party disputes arising from the reluctance of some shipowners to comply with orders to call at Romanian and Bulgarian ports. The existence of such enquiries does not imply a widespread cessation of services to these countries, but it does indicate a change in risk assessment.

The legal aspects of the issue are not confined to the JWC list. BIMCO’s updated standard clauses — CONWARTIME 2025 for time charters and VOYWAR 2025 for voyage charter parties — provide mechanisms for refusing unsafe orders, altering routes, adjusting costs and, in certain circumstances, cancelling voyages. A reasonable assessment of danger by the master or shipowner, as well as the specific wording of the contract, is crucial. The mere inclusion of an area on an insurance list does not create an automatic right to refuse orders under every charter party.

The 2025 standard clauses provide for reimbursement by the charterer of additional insurance costs actually incurred, taking account of applicable discounts and refunds. However, the parties should verify whether these particular provisions are incorporated into their contract, how the costs of ballast voyages, waiting time and alternative discharge are allocated, and whether the same expenses have already been included in the agreed rate.

The total cost of transport: expenses beyond freight

For the shipowner, the minimum acceptable voyage revenue must cover bunker costs, port and agency services, vessel operating or hire costs, additional insurance, crew-related expenses actually arising from the risk, and expected delays. A return on capital and residual risks not covered by insurance must also be taken into account. The cargo owner faces a further set of cost components, some of the maritime expenses potentially already being included in the freight rate.

  • Carrier tariff: the base rate and separately charged fuel, war risk, terminal and other surcharges.
  • Cargo insurance: separate cover for the cargo owner’s insurable interest, including war risks where agreed.
  • Rerouting: additional transshipment, road or rail legs, diversion and storage costs.
  • Time: vessel waiting time, container demurrage and detention, schedule disruption, additional inventories and the financing of goods in transit.
  • Delivery failure: potential contractual penalties, lost sales, deterioration of sensitive cargo and the cost of arranging an alternative route at short notice.

Consider the cost of time: if goods worth $100,000 spend an additional 15 days in transit, at an assumed annual financing cost of 12%, the additional capital cost would be around $493. In practice, this is only one element of the consequences of delay, as the cost of product shortages and disruption to production schedules may be considerably higher.

Alternative tariffs must be compared on the same delivery terms: either by considering all costs up to the same destination or by comparing clearly equivalent legs of the route. Otherwise, cheaper ocean freight may conceal substantially more expensive inland transport. An insurance premium or port charge must not be counted again if it is already included in the rate.

Who ultimately pays for war risk?

The allocation of expenses is determined not only by the transport contract but also by the bargaining power of the parties. When vessels are scarce, part of the war risk premium may be passed on to the charterer. When demand falls, the shipowner is forced either to absorb some of the cost increase or to withdraw from the market. A container line applies surcharges, while the freight forwarder must either pass them on to the customer or absorb them in its own margin if the contract does not permit a price revision.

Suppliers of bulk commodities are particularly vulnerable. If the price at the destination is determined by global competition, higher delivery costs tend to reduce the price that a trader is willing to pay the producer in the exporting country. In a simplified model, with the destination-port price fixed and all other factors unchanged, a $40 per tonne increase in freight could reduce the acceptable procurement price by the same $40. The actual distribution of losses between seller, buyer and intermediaries depends on the contractual terms and the possibility of switching suppliers.

For the Black Sea agricultural sector, this means that war risk directly affects export parity prices and producer incomes. For imports, it can lead to higher prices for imported goods and the need to hold larger safety stocks. For port businesses, it means falling throughput or the redistribution of cargo between terminals, but no guaranteed benefit even for ports that previously accommodated diverted flows.

Opportunities to reduce the cost of risk

One way of making shipping commercially viable is to share risk between the insurance market and the state. The Unity facility was established in November 2023, and in March 2024 Marsh McLennan, together with the Ukrainian government and Lloyd’s, announced its expansion to cover all non-military cargoes. The facility provided separate hull and liability war risk cover on more affordable terms.

Such mechanisms allow some losses to be redistributed, insurance capacity to be expanded and risk to be made acceptable to a larger number of shipowners. Their existence, however, does not establish that the original rates remained available in November 2026. Current limits, availability of cover and the applicability of the facility to a particular voyage must be confirmed with an insurer or broker. A financial guarantee is also no substitute for the physical safety of the crew and vessel.

For cargo owners and freight forwarders, a rational approach is to agree separately on the validity period of the rate and the procedure for revising surcharges, obtain war risk cover terms before dispatch, check alternative-port clauses and compare the cost of at least two genuinely available logistics options. Route reliability should be assessed not only by average transit time, but also by the range of possible delays. For shipowners, the availability of insurance capacity, sanctions compliance, documentation of actual expenses and assessment of crew safety remain essential.

What will shape the market in the winter of 2026–2027?

As of 16 November, three scenarios can reasonably be identified, without assigning probabilities that cannot be adequately estimated from public data.

Stabilisation. A sustained decline in the number of incidents and the restoration of safe port operations could expand the supply of insurance cover and gradually attract tonnage back to the region. Reductions in surcharges would depend on decisions by carriers and insurers; they would not necessarily coincide with an improvement in the situation.

Persistently high threat levels. In the absence of lasting changes, the most likely mechanism for maintaining trade within this scenario would involve selective route coverage, expensive short-term freight, additional charges and intermittent schedule disruptions. Low-margin cargoes and routes served by few alternative carriers would be particularly vulnerable.

Further escalation. Additional losses among merchant vessels could lead some insurers to withdraw cover and shipowners to introduce further restrictions. In this case, the issue would no longer be the size of the surcharge, but the physical availability of transport. Land routes and Danube infrastructure could not automatically absorb the entire displaced volume.

Indicators to monitor include the geography and frequency of attacks, revisions to the JWC Listed Areas, ranges of premiums for cover actually placed, the number of active vessels, the proportion of freight deals concluded relative to the offers received, the regularity of feeder services and queues along alternative transport corridors.

The cost not only of war, but also of uncertainty

CMA CGM’s $35 per TEU surcharge is the most visible, but by no means the most burdensome, component of the Black Sea’s new shipping economics. Its significance lies in the fact that war risk is becoming a distinct item in commercial tariffs for transport across the entire region served by the network, including ports in countries not directly involved in the war.

In the dry and liquid bulk segments, the consequences are potentially much more severe: insurance may cost hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars, available tonnage is shrinking, and the gap between asking prices and cargo owners’ willingness to pay can effectively bring the market to a standstill. All these factors reinforce the influence of the geography of risk on the competitiveness of Black Sea commodities and ports.

The war is changing more than the cost per kilometre of a sea voyage. It is changing the cost of access to the sea itself. As long as the feasibility of a voyage cannot be guaranteed, maritime logistics in the Black Sea region will be determined less by nominal transport prices than by the availability of a vessel, insurance cover, a safe route and a degree of predictability acceptable to all parties.

Methodology. This article is based on publicly available carrier announcements, JWC and BIMCO documents, insurance market reports and industry analysis available as of 16 November 2026. Links to sources are provided in the text. BlackSeaTrans calculation models illustrate the sensitivity of transport costs to changes in the underlying parameters. They are not estimates of the commercial costs of individual companies, current market quotations or forecasts with assigned probabilities. The study does not calculate a single representative freight or insurance rate for the entire Black Sea, owing to the heterogeneity of routes and the lack of publicly available data on concluded transactions.