Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has reshaped Eurasia’s transport geography, increasing Türkiye’s importance as a raw materials importer, industrial exporter, maritime transshipment hub and alternative overland route between Europe and Asia. Yet the statistics do not support the notion of an unqualified transit boom. Between 2021 and 2025, Turkish port cargo throughput increased by 5.1% and container throughput by 11.2%, while maritime transit cargo volumes measured in tonnes declined by 11.3%. The most significant changes concern not so much overall freight volumes as their geography, commodity composition and the economics of transport chains.

By November 2026, the initial phase of emergency cargo diversion had given way to a more complex process: the consolidation of new routes, tighter sanctions compliance controls, the partial recovery of Ukrainian maritime logistics and investment in alternative transport connections. Assessing the longer-term outlook requires distinguishing temporary market conditions from sustainable demand for transport services.

1. The pre-war baseline and four phases of freight flow restructuring

Türkiye had a well-developed transport system long before February 2022. Its customs union with the EU, the industrial specialisation of its western regions, maritime connections across the Mediterranean, energy imports from Russia, the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) railway commissioned in 2017 and the Marmaray tunnel all shaped its international logistics role independently of the war. Port throughput had already risen from 484.2 million tonnes in 2019 to 526.3 million tonnes in 2021. Subsequent growth cannot therefore be attributed entirely to wartime developments.

In 2022, the blockade of Ukrainian ports, the withdrawal of several international operators from Russia, sanctions and changes in energy prices caused an initial shock. Liquid bulk and transit flows in Türkiye expanded, while new demand emerged for regional container and road freight services. At the same time, national container throughput fell. A correction followed in 2023: some emergency transit traffic disappeared, and the earthquake of 6 February severely disrupted operations at İskenderun. Maersk’s operational updates from that period document cargo diversions and the suspension of operations at the affected port.

In 2024–2025, the container market recovered, the Middle Corridor gained prominence, and Ukraine’s maritime corridor brought some cargo back to the ports of Greater Odesa. In 2026, a new combination emerged: stagnant port tonnage, moderate container growth, persistent war-related risks and a shift towards long-term infrastructure investment. Rather than a single uninterrupted growth cycle, these developments represent successive phases of adaptation.

The modal distribution of foreign trade cargo confirms the resilience of the original model. According to June 2026 data from the Turkish Chamber of Shipping, sea transport accounted for 87.5% of foreign trade by physical volume in 2021, road transport for 10.7% and rail for 0.7%. In 2025, the corresponding shares were 87.2%, 11.4% and 0.5%. There was therefore no large-scale modal shift in foreign trade freight over these four years. Changes in routing within each mode were much more pronounced. These figures refer to foreign trade by mode of transport, not to all domestic transport activity in Türkiye.

2. Maritime freight trends: import growth rather than a transit boom

Table 1. Türkiye’s port cargo throughput by traffic category, million tonnes
YearExportsImportsCabotageTransitTotalYear-on-year change, %
2021153.76232.6361.9078.01526.31—
2022150.17243.9267.5081.02542.61+3.1
2023135.51256.2162.6366.74521.08−4.0
2024142.28257.1463.2669.06531.74+2.0
2025142.77271.6669.6869.16553.27+4.0
2025 vs 2021, %−7.1+16.8+12.6−11.3+5.1—

Source: TÜRKLİM, Sector Statistics; BlackSeaTrans calculations. Minor differences from the ministry’s preliminary figures reflect different statistical releases and rounding.

Over four years, total throughput increased by approximately 27 million tonnes, while import throughput rose by 39 million tonnes. In other words, imports grew by more than the entire port market, with declines in export and transit volumes partially offsetting that increase. The import share of throughput climbed from 44.2% to 49.1%, while the transit share fell from 14.8% to 12.5%.

This result changes how Türkiye’s logistics development should be interpreted. The country has indeed strengthened its role in supply chains, but a substantial proportion of the additional tonnage serves its own economy. For shipping companies and terminals, the issue is not merely whether inbound cargo arrives, but whether it generates a corresponding outbound flow that enables economically efficient utilisation and turnaround of vessels and equipment.

The ratio of import to export throughput increased from 1.51 in 2021 to 1.90 in 2025. This is not an empty-running ratio: bulk carriers, tankers and container ships operate in different segments. Nevertheless, it indicates a growing imbalance in the cargo base and the need to assess each trade lane and equipment type separately.

Table 2. Changes in the commodity composition of port throughput, million tonnes
Cargo type202120222023202420252025 vs 2021, %
Dry bulk170.63165.30153.71152.20160.94−5.7
General cargo61.4664.5754.8662.1065.85+7.1
Liquid bulk150.53171.20167.79162.21169.71+12.7
Containerised cargo131.86130.24133.47143.36144.34+9.5
Ro-Ro cargo11.8211.3011.2511.8712.43+5.1

Source: TÜRKLİM; BlackSeaTrans calculations. Containerised cargo tonnage should not be confused with the number of TEU handled.

The sharp rise in liquid bulk cargo in 2022 coincided with the restructuring of Europe’s energy market. By 2025, volumes in this category remained approximately 19 million tonnes above the pre-war baseline. Dry bulk cargo, by contrast, had not recovered to its 2021 level. The Turkish market is consequently becoming more heterogeneous: oil terminals, container facilities and businesses handling industrial raw materials are exposed to different economic cycles.

3. Containerisation: the initial transit surge and subsequent normalisation

Table 3. Container throughput by traffic category, million TEU
YearImportsExportsCabotageTransitTotalTransit share, %
20214.6774.7440.8322.33812.59118.6
20224.3874.3370.3423.15012.21525.8
20234.8314.9110.7602.26712.76817.8
20244.9884.8750.9032.76313.53020.4
20255.1375.1930.9492.71813.99719.4

Source: TÜRKLİM; shares calculated by BlackSeaTrans. The figures cover port handling operations, including empty containers.

In 2022, transit container throughput increased by almost 35% while overall container throughput fell by 3%. This is the clearest statistical evidence of the reorganisation of liner services during the first year of the war. By 2023, however, transit volumes had fallen by 28% from their peak. In 2025, they remained 16.2% above 2021 levels but 13.7% below those of 2022.

Part of the initial increase has therefore persisted, but import and export containers played the leading role in subsequent growth: their combined throughput rose from 9.42 million to 10.33 million TEU. This represents a more stable cargo base than transshipment traffic dependent on individual shipping lines’ hub location decisions.

The distinction between transit measured in tonnes and in TEU is particularly important. Over the period under review, the former declined while the latter increased. This is consistent with the hypothesis that container transshipment has become more important relative to other transit cargo, but without data on the weight and commodity composition of individual transit containers, the scale of this structural shift cannot be quantified.

4. The geographical centre of growth lies outside the Black Sea coast

Table 4. Regional distribution of Türkiye’s seaport throughput
Region2021, million tonnes2025, million tonnesChange, %2021, million TEU2025, million TEUChange, %
Sea of Marmara207.55228.82+10.27.6718.990+17.2
Mediterranean Sea181.89176.05−3.22.9022.944+1.4
Aegean Sea93.26104.55+12.11.9061.936+1.6
Black Sea43.6043.85+0.60.1130.127+13.0

Source: TÜRKLİM; BlackSeaTrans calculations based on unrounded figures.

Ports on the Sea of Marmara accounted for approximately 79% of the net increase in national cargo throughput and 94% of the net increase in container throughput between 2021 and 2025. Their share of container handling rose from 60.9% to 64.2%. The Black Sea coast, meanwhile, accounted for less than 1% of national container throughput in 2025, although its regional role in the movement of raw materials, general cargo and roll-on/roll-off freight remains substantial.

According to the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, the country’s largest container port districts in 2025 were Ambarlı (3.43 million TEU), Kocaeli (2.51 million TEU) and Tekirdağ (2.14 million TEU). Together, they handled approximately 58% of the country’s containers. These statistics refer to port districts rather than individual terminals.

There is a clear economic rationale for this concentration: the Sea of Marmara is close to Türkiye’s principal industrial and consumer markets, overland connections to the EU and mainline maritime services. It is here that the national container cargo base and international transit intersect. Black Sea ports such as Samsun, Karasu, Zonguldak and Trabzon have advantages on individual regional routes, but lack a comparable combined industrial hinterland.

The southern ports should be considered separately. The decline in Mediterranean tonnage reflects, among other factors, the disruptions of 2023 and subsequent developments in raw material flows. Mersin, İskenderun and Ceyhan provide access to the Middle East, the Suez Canal and deep-sea services. Their competitive advantage lies not in replacing the Sea of Marmara ports, but in serving a different hinterland and enabling cargo to be diverted when other routes are disrupted.

5. The Russian trade lane: from exceptional market conditions to heightened risk

In 2022–2023, trade relations with Russia became one of the main factors reshaping Turkish logistics. According to research published by Insight Turkey, the value of Turkish imports from Russia increased from USD 29 billion in 2021 to USD 58.8 billion in 2022. A doubling in value, however, does not imply a doubling in physical volume: global oil and gas prices changed sharply during that period.

Physical volumes reported in the Republic of Türkiye’s disclosure filed with the SEC in 2026 are more revealing. Russian crude oil imports increased from 5.4 million tonnes in 2021 to 12 million in 2022, reached 16.9 million in 2024 and totalled 15.2 million in 2025. Imports of Russian natural gas, by contrast, fell from 26.3 billion to 21.1 billion cubic metres between 2021 and 2025. These two trends cannot be combined into a maritime import measure, since a substantial share of natural gas arrives by pipeline.

In 2025, according to Türkiye’s Ministry of Transport, 101.6 million tonnes of cargo arrived by sea from Russia, representing approximately 37.4% of Türkiye’s total maritime import throughput. In tonnage terms, this significantly exceeded supplies from any other country. Such concentration provides a substantial cargo base, but also creates dependence on the availability of Russian ports, tanker fleets, insurance and international payment arrangements.

In the opposite direction, the initial growth in Turkish exports was associated both with the replacement of suppliers that had withdrawn and with intermediary trade. A European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) study at product-code level identified a significant acceleration in Turkish exports to Russia and Eurasian Economic Union countries following the invasion. Not all additional trade, however, constitutes re-exporting, and re-exporting is not in itself equivalent to a sanctions violation. Establishing a violation requires examining the specific product, transaction parties and applicable legislation.

By 2025, bilateral trade between Russia and Türkiye had declined to USD 49.1 billion from USD 52.4 billion in 2024. Turkish exports to Russia amounted to USD 6.7 billion and imports to USD 42.4 billion. The trade configuration that emerged after 2022 thus persists, but its commercial momentum no longer matches expectations during the initial growth phase. The European Commission’s 2026 report on Türkiye records continued efforts to prevent circumvention of EU restrictive measures.

For logistics, this means higher costs of verifying counterparties, cargo origin, end users, payment arrangements and insurance terms. A nominally shorter route may prove more expensive than an alternative if the likelihood of cargo detention or rejection by a bank is high. Future growth on the Russian trade lane should therefore not be extrapolated automatically from the 2022–2023 figures.

6. The Ukrainian trade lane: from maritime blockade to the restoration of direct services

Türkiye played a key role in establishing the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which operated from July 2022 until 17 July 2023. According to the United Nations, 32.8 million tonnes of foodstuffs were shipped from three Ukrainian ports under the initiative. These volumes, however, do not constitute Turkish port throughput: Istanbul also served as a vessel coordination and inspection centre, while consignments were destined for numerous countries.

Following the termination of the initiative and Ukraine’s establishment of its own maritime corridor, Türkiye’s role changed. The need for the previous form of intermediary coordination diminished, but the straits, Turkish buyers of Ukrainian raw materials and regional shipping networks retained their importance. In 2025, Ukrainian ports handled 82.2 million tonnes, including 44.2 million tonnes of agricultural cargo; container throughput rose from 129,900 TEU in 2024 to 215,700 TEU in 2025, according to the Ukrainian Sea Ports Authority (USPA).

Table 5. Ukraine–Türkiye bilateral trade, USD billion
YearTotal tradeChange, %
20217.42—
20227.60+2.4
20237.13−6.2
20246.20−13.0
20256.60+6.5

Source: Republic of Türkiye economic data disclosure, September 2026; percentage changes calculated using published rounded figures. These figures measure trade value, not physical volumes.

In 2025, Turkish exports to Ukraine amounted to approximately USD 3.97 billion and imports to USD 2.63 billion. This reflects not the disappearance of Ukrainian–Turkish trade links, but a substantial change in their composition. Turkish equipment, petroleum products, construction materials and consumer goods present a different logistics challenge from Ukrainian grain, oilseeds and metallurgical raw materials. The former more often require flexible delivery and frequent departures; the latter depend on efficient large-volume maritime logistics.

Competition continues between direct port calls and contingency routes through Romania, Bulgaria and the Danube ports. In July 2026, Maersk reported the temporary suspension of a specific feeder service via Chornomorsk Sea Fishing Port and the diversion of some cargo to Constanța. This does not mean that all container services in Ukraine were suspended, but illustrates why shippers require contingency supply chains even as direct services recover.

A new structural factor is the Ukraine–Türkiye Free Trade Agreement. According to Türkiye’s Ministry of Trade, the agreement entered into force on 1 October 2026, with tariff concessions scheduled to apply from 1 January 2027. Subsequent trade growth will depend on rules of origin, specific tariff lines and the condition of the Ukrainian economy, not merely on lower duties. Nevertheless, the agreement provides a foundation for sustained development of bilateral container and road freight traffic, including after the war.

7. Road transport and Ro-Ro: flexibility at the cost of border dependence

Maritime logistics dominates Turkish foreign trade by weight, but road transport plays a disproportionately important role in the movement of industrial goods. The EU customs union underpins westbound trade, but does not remove the constraints of the international road freight market. In 2025, total trade in goods between Türkiye and the EU reached EUR 217.6 billion, with the EU accounting for 42.7% of Turkish goods exports, according to the European Commission. Despite the trade surge following the start of the full-scale war, the Russian market is not comparable to the European market in its importance for Turkish industrial exports.

The main overland routes pass through Kapıkule and Hamzabeyli on the Bulgarian border, İpsala on the Greek border, Sarp on the Georgian border, Gürbulak towards Iran and Habur towards Iraq. Ro-Ro services connecting Türkiye to European ports allow hauliers to bypass part of the overland route, reduce tractor-unit mileage and, when transporting unaccompanied semi-trailers, save drivers’ working time.

Changes are also visible in eastbound road freight. According to a presentation by the International Transporters’ Association (UND) at Danube Ports Days 2025, the number of loaded trucks travelling from Europe through Türkiye in transit to third countries increased from 67,400 in 2022 to 70,500 in 2023 and 83,900 in 2024. Between 2023 and 2024, trips to Kazakhstan increased from 3,470 to 5,780, to Uzbekistan from 1,110 to 2,280, and to Azerbaijan from 7,430 to 9,630. Significant flows also served Georgia, Iran and Iraq. The 24% growth of this segment over two years reflects expanding eastbound road transit, but these figures do not cover all Turkish road freight operations or establish that all additional cargo was diverted from Russian routes.

For the Ukrainian market, an important development was the February 2024 extension of the permit-free regime for bilateral and transit road freight transport until at least the end of the war. The parties also agreed to allow empty vehicles to enter. Liberalisation of bilateral transport, however, does not eliminate rules governing third-country operations, transit documentation requirements or border delays.

Access to the Schengen area for Turkish drivers presents a separate challenge. In October 2026, UND representatives estimated that approximately 25,000 drivers were affected by visa restrictions. This industry estimate does not imply that all of them ceased working simultaneously, but indicates the potential scale of the capacity constraint. For a carrier, waiting time reduces the number of round trips per vehicle and increases delivery costs even if the rate per kilometre remains unchanged.

Black Sea Ro-Ro services can complement the overland network. Pre-war links connecting Chornomorsk with Samsun and Istanbul offered substantial potential, but according to official documentation for the Ukrainian concession project published in September 2026, regular ferry operations at the terminal had not yet resumed. In 2015–2018, the terminal handled an average of 1.7 million tonnes annually against a design capacity of 4.5 million tonnes. A sustained resumption of services would provide shippers with additional options, particularly if rail connections are available.

8. The Middle Corridor: a strategic alternative, not a substitute for maritime transport

The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) attracted a fundamentally different level of attention after 2022. Its core configuration involves overland transit across Kazakhstan, a crossing of the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and Georgia, followed by onward connections either through Türkiye or through Georgian Black Sea ports. This branching configuration is crucial: TITR tonnage is not equivalent to transit through Turkish territory.

Table 6. Middle Corridor freight volumes, million tonnes
YearVolumeTrend
2021Approx. 0.6Pre-war baseline
20232.76Acceleration after 2022
20244.48+62.3% vs 2023
20254.12−8.0% vs 2024

Sources: Austrian transport ministry (various estimates place the pre-war baseline at approximately 0.5–0.6 million tonnes); The Astana Times, citing Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Transport (2023–2025). Statistical coverage differs between publications; growth rates for 2024–2025 are calculated from a single series.

The decline in tonnage in 2025 does not negate long-term growth, but demonstrates its non-linear nature. At the same time, approximately 77,000 TEU were transported along the route, and Kazakhstan set a target of 300,000 TEU by 2029. Achieving that target would imply an almost fourfold increase in container traffic over four years; such a pace should not be taken for granted.

The corridor is particularly promising for goods sensitive to delivery times and political risks, including machinery, components, certain categories of electronics and textiles. For low-value bulk cargo, multiple transshipments, the use of Caspian vessels and different railway infrastructure standards may offset the advantages of distance. Beyond intercontinental transit, the growing trade of the Caucasus and Central Asian countries themselves is also important.

Key factors include the availability of rail wagons and Caspian vessels, regular departures, tariff coordination and the synchronisation of railway, border and terminal operations. The Akhalkalaki–Kars section includes a break of gauge between 1,520 mm and 1,435 mm. The Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway underwent reconstruction and returned to full operation in May 2024, according to CAREC. Capacity on an individual section is not equivalent to the ability of the entire chain to deliver freight within a guaranteed timeframe.

In September 2026, the World Bank published a new assessment: investment in the transport system could more than triple trade volumes along the route and halve transport times by 2040, while combining investment with institutional reforms could quadruple volumes. These are conditional long-term modelling results, not a forecast of Turkish transit alone or a guaranteed outcome by 2030.

9. Railway infrastructure: the principal constraint on Türkiye’s transit model

Türkiye’s central challenge is to develop a coherent railway system linking its eastern border, industrial west and the EU. Even with growing interest in rail transit, maritime and road transport remain dominant. Railway development therefore primarily represents an opportunity to change the modal structure of freight movements rather than evidence of an already achieved scale of transit.

National railway statistics likewise do not confirm a general freight boom. According to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) project document of November 2025, railway freight volumes nationwide amounted to 38.2 million tonnes in 2021, 38.9 million in 2022, 32.4 million in 2023 and 26.1 million in 2024. This represents a 32% decline relative to 2021 in the series reported in the document. Rapid growth along a small international corridor can therefore coexist with declining freight volumes across the national network. Türkiye’s rail priorities include not only new transit segments, but also restoring the competitiveness of domestic rail freight.

In December 2024, the World Bank approved USD 660 million in financing to modernise and electrify the 660-kilometre Divriği–Kars railway route. It connects the eastern periphery to the country’s existing network. A separate project involves a new 127-kilometre Istanbul rail bypass crossing the Bosphorus via the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge. In March 2026, the World Bank approved a USD 2 billion loan as part of a coordinated USD 6.75 billion financing package.

The new crossing is of systemic importance: the existing Marmaray tunnel must accommodate both passenger and freight services. The bypass would separate some of these flows, increase timetable flexibility and connect the eastern and western regions without requiring freight trains to pass through the congested urban system. Financing approval, however, does not mean that the new capacity is already available. The European Commission’s November report notes that procurement procedures for the project had not yet begun.

A third development is the Halkalı–Kapıkule railway, linked to the European TEN-T network. The same 2026 European Commission report notes progress in construction and testing on individual sections, but also the need to improve infrastructure access and system interoperability. The condition of the entire route cannot be assessed from the readiness of a single section. International intermodal services require not only new infrastructure, but also coordinated freight train paths, terminals and guaranteed connections in Bulgaria and elsewhere in the EU.

In southern Türkiye, the Mersin–Adana–Osmaniye–Gaziantep railway corridor, estimated by the European Commission to be approximately 85% physically complete, is expected to strengthen links between industrial areas and ports. Further ahead, the Iraq Development Road project could provide an additional connection to the Persian Gulf, but its prospective freight traffic should not be included in baseline estimates of current transport capacity.

10. The Turkish Straits: greater strategic importance does not imply greater physical transit

The Bosphorus and Dardanelles remain indispensable maritime gateways from the Black Sea to global markets. The Montreux Convention governs passage, but restrictions on naval traffic must be distinguished from conditions for merchant shipping. The strategic importance of the straits can increase even when physical traffic volumes do not.

According to statistics published by Türkiye’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hazardous cargo carried by tankers through the Bosphorus amounted to 147.2 million tonnes in 2021 and 169.8 million in 2025 (+15.3%). The corresponding figure for the Dardanelles rose from 168.0 million to 193.3 million tonnes (+15.1%). These figures cannot be added to calculate unique cargo volumes, since some vessels pass through both straits.

The military threat in the Black Sea increases volatility in port calls and insurance costs. In September 2026, the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) reported a decline in oil exports through Russian Black Sea ports following attacks on infrastructure. The risks extend beyond Russian commodities: the Novorossiysk area handles a substantial share of Kazakhstan’s oil exports via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium system.

For Türkiye, this has a two-sided effect. Cargo diversion may generate additional revenue for terminals and agents, but disruptions to energy supply and rising freight rates can increase costs for domestic industry. The economic interests of the logistics sector and those of the national economy do not necessarily coincide.

11. What the latest 2026 figures show

Table 7. Türkiye’s maritime freight, January–October 2026
IndicatorJanuary–October 2026Change vs same period 2025, %
Total cargo throughput457.39 million tonnes+0.2
Export cargo113.74 million tonnes−5.1
Import cargo215.54 million tonnes−3.2
Foreign trade tonnage excluding transit329.28 million tonnes−3.9
Total container throughput11.95 million TEU+2.3
Export containers4.38 million TEU+2.4
Import containers4.40 million TEU+1.5

Source: Türkiye’s Directorate General of Maritime Affairs, bulletins of 10 November 2026: cargo statistics and container statistics.

Foreign trade tonnage declined by nearly 13.35 million tonnes, while overall throughput increased slightly. The combined growth of transit and cabotage therefore offset this decline. In October 2026, import cargo throughput fell by 16.1% year on year, while transit tonnage increased by 17.6% and cabotage by 18.0%. A single month cannot establish whether this trend is sustainable, but aggregate figures already indicate divergent trajectories for foreign trade tonnage and the container market.

If November and December maintain approximately the same absolute volumes as a year earlier, the annual result will be around 554 million tonnes and 14.27 million TEU. Extrapolating the average throughput of the first ten months yields approximately 549 million tonnes and 14.34 million TEU. Taking both approaches into account, a working range for the end of 2026 is 549–560 million tonnes and 14.2–14.4 million TEU, assuming no significant new disruptions. This is an editorial estimate, not a published annual result or a statistical confidence interval.

12. The economics of the emerging logistics system

Transport operators in Türkiye work across several business models simultaneously. In the raw materials segment, the principal factors are tonnage, regularity of supply, the availability of specialised vessels and energy costs. In container logistics, they are port call frequency, equipment turnaround, consolidation opportunities and access to the industrial hinterland. In transcontinental transit, competitiveness depends primarily on the reliability of the entire chain rather than the distance between origin and destination.

Route comparisons should take into account the total expected cost of delivery: transport charges, handling and storage, insurance, inventory financing and expected losses from delays. For example, for a consignment of industrial goods worth EUR 100,000 and an assumed annual cost of capital of 10%, ten additional days in transit imply approximately EUR 274 in financing costs, even before production downtime, contractual penalties and storage are considered. This is an illustrative calculation, not an observed market rate.

Sustainable demand for new corridors arises where customers’ willingness to pay for shorter transit times or reduced uncertainty exceeds the additional costs of transshipment and border crossings. Maritime services, overland transport and combined rail–sea routes therefore often serve different market niches. Treating any one of them as a universal substitute for the others does not reflect the structure of the actual market.

Air freight occupies a distinct niche. According to Istanbul Airport statistics based on DHMİ data, air cargo volumes excluding baggage and mail increased from 0.78 million tonnes in 2021 to 2.09 million in 2025. It would be incorrect to attribute all this growth to the war: cargo operations were also transferred from Atatürk Airport to the new airport in 2022. The development of the air freight hub expands opportunities for urgent shipments, pharmaceuticals, components and e-commerce cargo, but cannot replace high-volume maritime and land transport.

Finally, nominal capacity must be distinguished from available capacity. According to figures cited by the Turkish Chamber of Shipping, in 2025 actual terminal throughput amounted to 14 million TEU against estimated aggregate container capacity of 25.9 million TEU, or approximately 54%. This average, however, does not describe the capacity available at each port in any given week. Spare berth capacity does not guarantee available storage space, a suitable rail platform, a vessel slot or timely cargo clearance. The ability to coordinate these elements may become a more significant competitive advantage for Türkiye than expanding nominal terminal capacity.

13. Development scenarios for 2027–2030

Any forecast must recognise that the full year 2026 has not yet ended and future military and political developments cannot be reliably quantified. The scenarios below are therefore not probabilistic forecasts. They use an assumed 2026 baseline of 554 million tonnes and 14.3 million TEU to illustrate possible four-year outcomes under different average annual growth rates. For comparison, actual average annual growth in 2021–2025 was approximately 1.3% in tonnage and 2.7% in TEU.

Table 8. Türkiye’s port throughput scenarios to 2030
ScenarioAverage annual tonnage growth2030, million tonnesAverage annual TEU growth2030, million TEU
Adverse−1…+0.5%532–5650…2%14.3–15.5
Baseline+1…2.5%576–612+2.5…4%15.8–16.7
Favourable+3…4.5%624–661+4.5…6%17.1–18.1

Source: BlackSeaTrans scenario calculations using compound growth from the assumed 2026 baseline. Growth rates reflect expert judgement; the ranges are not statistical confidence intervals. Outcomes also depend on global trade and Türkiye’s macroeconomic conditions.

Baseline scenario. Geopolitical fragmentation continues while the main trade routes remain operational. Russian raw materials remain a substantial component of Turkish imports, but intermediary freight flows do not repeat their 2022 surge. Ukrainian–Turkish trade gradually recovers, and tariff concessions stimulate selected commodity groups. Marmara container hubs grow faster than overall tonnage, while the Middle Corridor expands gradually. Key infrastructure projects improve individual parts of the system, but not all constraints are removed by 2030.

Favourable scenario. Security conditions in the Black Sea stabilise, Ukrainian reconstruction advances with sufficient financing, regular ferry services resume, rail connections with the EU improve and Middle Corridor procedures become better coordinated. Turkish suppliers of equipment and construction materials gain additional markets, and terminals acquire new return cargo flows. At the same time, reduced risks could shift some handling activity back to Ukrainian ports. A favourable trade scenario therefore does not necessarily imply the greatest possible increase in Türkiye’s transit handling share.

Adverse scenario. War-related risks intensify, energy supplies are disrupted, sanctions pressure increases, difficulties arise at European borders or external demand weakens. Additional emergency handling of individual cargo flows does not offset the decline in overall trade activity. Freight, insurance and working capital costs rise, while investment in new capacity may outpace actual demand.

A separate forecast is appropriate for the Middle Corridor: from 4.12 million tonnes in 2025 to approximately 5–7 million tonnes in 2030 under the baseline scenario and 8–11 million tonnes if infrastructure and administrative constraints are removed more rapidly. These ranges correspond to average annual growth rates of approximately 4–11% and 14–22%, respectively, over five years; they describe the route as a whole, not Türkiye’s share. The target of 11 million tonnes by 2030 published by the Austrian transport ministry in August 2026 should be regarded as a conditional upper benchmark rather than an inevitable outcome.

14. Indicators to monitor

The most informative indicator of the sustainability of the Turkish model will not be an overall port throughput record, but the relative share of national import and export traffic compared with international transshipment. If transit container traffic once again grows faster than bilateral cargo flows, this will indicate a strengthening hub function. Tonnage growth driven solely by raw material imports would indicate a different economic model.

On the Russian trade lane, it is important to monitor the physical composition of shipments separately from trade values, the frequency of disruptions at Black Sea ports and the availability of payments and insurance. On the Ukrainian trade lane, relevant indicators include the number of direct liner services, ferry service regularity, the commodity composition of trade after January 2027 and the availability of reconstruction funding. On the Middle Corridor, actual transit times and their variability, as well as the proportion of shipments routed via the Turkish rail branch, matter more than total TITR tonnage alone.

On the European trade lane, indicators include border clearance times, driver availability, Ro-Ro departure frequency, actual freight capacity on the Halkalı–Kapıkule line and implementation milestones for the new Bosphorus rail crossing. Only a combination of these indicators can establish whether investment plans are translating into available transport capacity.

Conclusions

Since February 2022, Türkiye has strengthened its strategic importance in international logistics, but statistical outcomes differ from the most optimistic expectations of a transit boom. Between 2021 and 2025, import growth was the principal source of increased port tonnage, while overall maritime transit measured in tonnes declined. Container transit proved more resilient, but has yet to regain its 2022 peak. The geographical centre of growth was the Sea of Marmara rather than the Black Sea coast itself.

Future prospects will depend on the country’s ability to move from exploiting opportunities created by emergency cargo redistribution towards developing sustainable transport services. The Russian trade lane will remain a significant source of bulk cargo, albeit with heightened uncertainty. The European market will retain its role as the main cargo base for industrial exports. Ukrainian reconstruction and the implementation of tariff preferences create a distinct growth opportunity. The Middle Corridor will gradually expand the geography of accessible markets, but will remain constrained for some time by capacity and the quality of cross-border coordination.

The war accelerated the emergence of a more complex freight system, but did not create it from scratch. The most likely legacy of this period is not Türkiye’s transformation into a universal alternative to northern Eurasian routes, but its consolidation as a major industrial and logistics hub with several complementary trade lanes. Its competitiveness will depend on service regularity, predictable costs and the ability to divert cargo between routes without prolonged disruption to supply chains.

Methodology. The baseline year is 2021; the period following the start of the full-scale invasion is 2022–2026. The latest available comparable monthly maritime statistics cover January–October 2026 and were published on 10 November. Port throughput, TEU counts, trade turnover in monetary terms and corridor freight volumes have different statistical boundaries and cannot be added together. Detailed origin–destination–mode freight matrices, comparable freight rates, a complete rail freight series for 2025–2026 and actual volumes on the Turkish branch of the Middle Corridor in a consistent series were not established. Consequently, the causal contribution of the war, future volumes on individual routes and tariffs are not presented as measured quantities. Forecasts are conditional editorial scenarios.